Beretning om seilbåt i Andrea stormen

[Enzo]

Tenkte det kunne være av interesse å lese denne beretningen

 

 

 

May 12th 2007

 

This is the log of actions and events driven by the only subsequently named Sub-tropical Storm Andrea, leading to the sinking of s/v Sean Seamour II and the successful rescue of its entire crew on the early morning of May 7th 2007.

 

For heavy weather and collision contingencies cutter rigged Sean Seamour II was equipped with two drogues (heavy and light), collision mat, auxiliary electric pump, as well as extensive power tools to enable repairs at sea with the 2.4kva inverter. Operational process and use of this equipment was discussed at length with the crew in anticipation. Other physical process contingencies such as lashing, closing seacocks, companionway doors, etc. were equally treated.

 

The 7 day weather GRIBs downloaded almost daily from April 25th onwards showed no inconsistencies, with the two high and two low pressure systems fairly balanced over the western Atlantic. Only the proximity of the two low pressure systems seemed to warrant surveillance as the May 5th GRIB would indicate with a flow increase from the N,NO from 20 to 35 knots focused towards coastal waters.

 

Already on a northerly course some 200 nautical miles out, I maintained our navigational plan with a N,NE heading until increased winds warranted a more easterly tack planned approximately 300 nautical miles north of Bermuda towards the Azores.

 

Wind force increased about eight hours earlier than expected and later shifted to the NE reaching well into the 60 knots range by early afternoon, then well beyond as the winds shifted. Considering that we were confronted with a sustained weather system that was quite different from the gulf stream squall lines we had weathered previous days, by mid afternoon I decided to take appropriate protective measures.

 

From our last known position approximately 217 nautical miles east of Cape Hatteras I reversed course, laying my largest drogue off the starboard stern while maintaining a quarter of the storm jib on the inner roller furl. This was designed to balance the boat's natural windage due in large part to its hard dodger and center cockpit structure.

 

By late afternoon the winds were sustained at well over 70 knots and seas were building fast. I estimate seas were well into 25 feet by dusk but after adding approximately 150 feet of drogue line the vessel handled smoothly over the next eight hours advancing with the seas at about 6 knots (SOG). By late evening the winds were sustained above 74 kts and a crew member recorded a peak of 85.5 kts.

 

Growing and irregular seas were the primary concern as in the very early hours of the morning the boat was increasingly struck by intermittent waves to its port side. Crew had to be positioned against the starboard side as both were tossed violently across the boat. Water began to accumulate seemingly fed through the stern engine-room air cowls. I believe in retrospect the goosenecks were insufficient with the pitch of larger waves as they were breaking onto the stern.

 

At approximately 02.45 hours we were violently knocked all the way down to starboard. It appears that the resulting angle and tension may have caused the drogue line to rupture (clean cut), perhaps as it rubbed against the same engine-room air-intake cowl positioned just below the cleat. The line was attached to the port side main winch then fed through the cleat where it was covered with anti-chaffing tape and lubricant. Before abandoning ship I noticed the protected part of the line was intact and extended beyond the cleat some five inches. Its position in the cleat rather than retracted from it also supports this theory.

 

After the knockdown I knew there was already structural damage and that we had lost control of the vessel. I pulled the GPIRB (registered to USCG documented Sean Seamour II) but I suspect that the old EPIRB from 1996 (Registered to USCG documented Lou Pantaï, but kept as the vessel was sold to an Italian national in 1998) might have been automatically launched first. I kept this unit as a redundancy latched in its housing on the port side of the hard dodger; it may have been ejected upon the first knockdown as Coast Guard Authorities questioned relatives with this vessel name versus Sean Seamour II. Herein lies a question that needs to be answered, hopefully it will be in light of the USCG report.

 

The GPIRB initially functioned but the strobe stopped and the intensity of the light diminished rapidly to the extent that I do not know if the Coast Guard received that signal. At the time were worried the unit was not emitting and I re initiated the unit twice. The unit sent for recertification with the life raft a few weeks prior had been returned from River Services. They had responded to Holland Marine that the unit was good until this coming November, functioned appropriately, and that the battery had an extra five year life expectancy. I will await reception of the Coast Guard report to find out if one or both signals was processed as all POCs were questioned regarding Lou Pantaï and not my current vessel Sean Seamour II (both vessels had been / in the case of Sean Seamour II is US Coast Guard documented).

 

As all communications excepting hand held VHF were down (SSB antennae on backstay, DSC VHF down and backup antennae inaccessible, Iridium soaked in roll, GPIRB not functioning, EPIRB seemingly lost to sea when hard dodger sheared) too much time was dedicated to hailing over the hand held VHFs and attempting to re-initialize the GPRIB). Had I cut the rig, dumped the 150 yards of chain in the bow, plugged the deck through mast passage and rerouted the rule pumps through the deck air cowl vents, we could have jump started the engine, deployed a second drogue with the sixty yards of stern anchor chain and regained control of the vessel. But that critical time window was lost

 

Expecting worse to come I re-lashed and locked all openings and the companionway. At 02:53hours we were struck violently again and began a roll to 180 degrees. As the vessel appeared to stabilize in this position I unlocked the companionway roof to exit an see where the life raft was. It had disappeared from its poop deck cradle which I could directly access as the helm and pedestal had been torn away. When I emerged to the surface against the boat's starboard (in righted port position) it began its second 180 degree roll. As it emerged the rig was almost longitudinal to the boat barely missing the stern arch. Spreaders were arrayed over cockpit and port side, mast cleanly bent at deck level, fore stays apparently torn away.

 

I ordered the crew to start all pumps. By their own volition they also cut out 2.5 gallon water bottles to enable physical bailing while I continued to locate the life raft. It finally appeared upside down under the rig. As its sea anchors and canopy lines were entangled in the rig and partially torn by one of the spreaders I decided to cut them away in an effort to save time and effort. I needed the crew below and had to manage the rig entanglement alone. This done I managed to move the unit forward and use its windward position to blow it over the bow to starboard, attaching it still upside down.

 

Below, water was being stabilized above the knees. The new higher positioned house battery bank was not shorted by the water level but the engine bank was flooded not enabling us to start the engine and pump from the bilge instead of the seacock. In retrospect this was not a loss as having to keep one of the companionway doors off for bailing and to route the Rule pump pipe, the water pouring in from here and the through-deck mast hole were no match for the impeller' volume. Plugging the mast passage was also not a solution as it was moving and hitting violently against the starboard head wall and was dangerous to try to cope with.

 

I knew the situation was desperate but it was still safer to stay aboard than to abandon ship, let alone in the dark any earlier than necessary. Estimating daylight at about 05:30 hours, we needed to hold on for at least another two hours. As the boat shifted in the waves it became increasingly vulnerable to flooding from breaking waves. One such wave at about 05:20 added about 18 inches of water, as the bow was now barely emerged these two factors triggered my decision to abandon ship. I exited first knowing that the raft was still upside down. In addition, some of the canopy lines still needed to be cut from the rig entanglement. In the precipitation the grab bag containing Iridium phone, VHF, GPS and all our personal and ship documents was lost.

 

As we boarded the now upturned raft it immediately flooded with the breaking waves and once unprotected from the wind by the hull structure was prone to turn over (no sea anchors nor canopy to roll over on). Hypothermia was already gaining upon one of my crew and myself and our efforts to right and re-enter the raft drained strength. Periods spent lying on the overturned raft exposed to the wind seemed to further weaken us.

 

Sean Seamour II sank a few minutes after we abandoned ship fully disappearing from view after the second wave crest.

 

We became aware of fixed wing overflight sometime between 06:00 and 07:00 hours and estimate that the Coast Guard helicopter arrived some time around 08:30 hours. As seemingly the most affected by hypothermia and almost unconscious the crew had me lifted out first. It was a perilous process during which Coast Guard AST2 Dazzo was himself injured (later to be hospitalized with us). The life raft was destroyed and abandoned by AST2 Dazzo as the third crew member was extracted. He also recouped the GPIRB which remained in USCG custody.

 

The emotions and admiration felt by my crew and myself to the dedication of this Coast Guard team is immeasurable, all the more so when hearing them comment on the severity and risk of the extraction, perhaps the worst they had seen in ten years (dixit SAT2 Dazzo). They claim to have measured 50 plus foot waves which from our perspective were mountains. We measured after the first knockdown and before loosing our rig winds still in excess of 72 knots.

 

Also to be commended are the medical teams involved, from our ambulatory transfer of custody from the rescue team to the personnel awaiting us at Cherry Point Naval Hospital. There the personnel under Director for Administration CDR Robert S. Fry sought not only to address our physical and medical trauma, but preempted the humanitarian crisis we were facing after all this loss and anguish by bringing in the disaster relief assistance of the American Red Cross to whom we owe the clothes, shelter and food that helped us survive this ordeal.

 

The link below leads to the video footage of this rescue presented to the 34 member countries at the 2007 25 year anniversary of COSPAS-SARSAT. Rescue swimmer Drew Dazzo will receive the Star of Courage from the Canadian Government in recognition. The crew with a faulty ACR GPIRB believed no rescue would be forthcoming but miracles happen, notably in the extraordinary valor an courage of the US Coast Guard crew, since distinguished for their feat, saving the lives of the crew.

 

 

Post scriptums :

 

The EPIRB issue

The Coast Guard Team

Our custodial process, homeland security

The reconstitution of events for Flying Colors

Hapag Lloyd' Paris Express

Rogue wave research and incoming data

 

 

About Sean Seamour

 

Builder: Beneteau' Wauquiez shipyard

Designer: Farr Yacht Design, Ltd

LOA: 44'7"

LWL: 40'

Beam: 14'

Draft: 5'11"

Ballast: 6,835 lbs

Displacement: 23,369 lbs

 

 

http://artseaprovence.blogharbor.com/blog/_archives/2007/6/27/3049534.html

 

 

 

Og her er stormen

Redigert 2.April.2011 av Enzo (see edit history)

[Jawik]

En beretning som endte bra og en tankevekker for oss andre.

[Kjappfot]

Uff, de var heldige som klarte seg. Vurderer å kjøpe redningsdrakter eller passasjerdrakter å ha ombord. Må man forlate en synkende båt er oddsen for å overleve mye bedre i våre kalde farvann. Nødustyr med dårlige batterier igjen er skremmende - var ikke det tilfellet på Berserk også?

[Bitteliten]

Takk for en interessant historie. Jeg lurer litt på hva som er best storm taktikk. Å bruke driv anker eller å seile unna? Ragnar Kvam seilte unna i orkan og klarte det bra. Rednings drakter skal vi ha. Og jeg lurer på to rednings flåter. En på dekk og en i bag under dekk.

[olews]

Erfaringer har vist bland annet den stygge Sydney Hobart stormen at de båtene med kompetent mannskap som kunne

fortsette å seile regatta og ha kontroll klarte seg bra. De som ble handlingslammet klarte seg mindre bra og fikk

etter hvert en sjø beam on (sjø fra siden tipper nesten en hvilkensomhelst båt rundt. ref. Segling i hårdt väder).

 

Desverre har mange av oss kun en eller kanskje to ombord og da nytter det ikke å styre for hånd så lenge.

 

Da må man legge ut en fallskjerm som stopper båten helt. Driften er mindre enn 1 knop. Med baugen mot vinden

bør det gå bra (igjen ref til boka som på svensk heter Segling i hård väder). Jeg kan finne dem fram i morgen

når jeg kan lete uten å vekke unger. Jeg kan finne fram til avsnittene som er de relevante. Jeg stoler veldig

på denne boka. Har den gamle av Adlard Coles også, men den er litt utdatert.

 

Størrelse betyr mye. Min egen 31' sliter veldig i 15-17 m/s med å krysse, mens en Clipper 68 med staysail

og etpar rev krysser utmerket i 17 m/s og er en fryd å håndtere. Et mannskap på 18 hjelper også. Men kreftene

er store med så stor båt og så mye vind.

 

 

 

Ole

[Enzo]

Nå påstås det av flere at nyere båtkonstruksjoner gjør at man bare kan kaste alle de gamle stormtaktikkbøkene på fyllinga, nyere mer moderne båter er sikrere i grisevær enn gamle langkjølte konstruksjoner når man vet hvordan man skal seile de. Jeg vet faktisk ikke men lærer gjerne om det.

 

Når vi nå ser på denne båten tråden handler om så er det en sentercocpitbåt, og den har vel en kjøl% på rundt 29%, noe som vel er lite når den heller ikke stikker spesielt dypt og heller ikke kan trekke inn kjølen (ovni).

 

Ballast: 3100kg

Displacement: 10622kg

 

Jeg har en oceanis 43 og når jeg leser en story som denne så vekker det absolutt spørsmålet om jeg ville klare meg bedre i orkan om jeg istedet eide en ovni,HC,HR eller X-yacht for den del.

 

Man ønsker jo ikke å seile i orkan men det kan jo komme til den dagen når man ikke har noe valg

Redigert 3.April.2011 av Enzo (see edit history)

[olews]

Boken heter "Adlard Coles. Hård väder till havs", av Peter Bruce, 6. utgave, 2009. ISBN-978-91-1-302328-1

Dette er en oversetteslse. Orginalen er : Heavy Weather Sailing, av Peter Bruce,

den er oversatt av Carl Erik Tovås og Per Runhammar.

 

Del 1 om "Att konstruera båter for hård väder" inneholder masse nyttig informasjon om stabilitet og bølger.

Samme med del 2 "Stabil båt i brytanse sjö". Del 3 "Båtdesign for hårt väder".

 

Del 6 "Föberedelser för hårt väder" og del 7 "Att använda drivanordningar"

 

Alt dette er er prøvde løsninger som er basert på erfaringer og teoretisk diskusjon etterpå.

 

Det er veldig mye som har skjedd siden jeg fikk 3. utgave av K. Adlard Coles fra 1980 til fødselsdagen min

for 20 år siden.

 

Jeg tar med et bilde av opprørt hav, det har ikke endret seg stort på 20 år.

 

 

Særlig gjorde teksten til bilder inntrykk på meg :

"In storms of extreme violence seas can become absolutely chaotic. Note the perpendicular wave rising

against the sky at the left centre"

 

 

 

og her : "...It is diffucult to understand how any yacht, or even a small ship, can survive such seas"

 

 

Jeg ser med skrekkblandet fryd fram til å møte slike i the roaring forties til høsten.

 

 

mvh,

Ole